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Consensual Sexual Dysphoria:
A Challenge for Campus Life
Robin West

Introduction
The subject of this symposium, and of the essays generated by it, echo the
debates regarding civil rights on university and college campuses of the past
half-decade: the severity and frequency of sexual assault on those campuses, the
challenge to equal education opportunity those assaults constitute, and what
schools should, and should not, be doing to address it. The nonconsensuality
of sexual assault—both rape and lesser degrees of sexual assault—have framed
many of those debates. Both on campus and off, we currently argue over how
consent and nonconsent are to be defined when what is consented or not
consented to is sexual, whether the consent required for sex to be legal should
be manifested by affirmative words or acts, how nonconsent relates to force and
how to coercion, whether rape should or should not definitionally require both
the presence of nonconsent and coercion, or nonconsent and force, or perhaps
all three, or, put affirmatively, whether nonconsensual sex alone, with no other
requirements or qualifiers—full stop, so to speak—constitutes rape.1 If rape is so
defined—simply as nonconsensual sex—does it over-criminalize sex that, while
concededly immoral, should not be regarded as a crime, such as, perhaps,
sex procured by fraud?2 Or does rape, so defined, undercriminalize sex that,
while concededly consensual, should nevertheless be criminalized in some
way, as is sex procured through coercive threats?3 However we should define
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A voluminous literature spanning several decades addresses the troubled relationship of
consent or nonconsent to rape. For significant contemporary contributions, see Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 431 (2016) (proposing a definition of
rape that eliminates the requirement of nonconsent, and instead focuses on power inequities);
Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 Yale L.J. 1372
(2013) (proposing that rape laws be based on principles of self-possession rather than sexual
autonomy); Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform,
125 Yale L.J. 1820 (2016) (defending the definition of rape as nonconsensual sex and the
use of an affirmative consent standard in campus adjudications of sexual assault); Scott A.
Anderson, Conceptualizing Rape as Coerced Sex, 15 Ethics 20 (2015) (proposing a definition of
rape based on coercion rather than nonconsent or force).
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See Anderson, supra note 1, at 71-76.
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rape, though, sex-without-consent—nonconsensual sex, for short—is without
question some kind of wrong, and the goal of a substantial body of scholarship,
of multiple scholarly colloquia and symposia, of classroom discussions across
a range of disciplines, and maybe most important, of informal conversations
in dorm rooms, on quads, and in dining halls, all over the past half-decade at
least, has been to be clear on exactly what that wrong is. Sex-without-consent
is clearly a violation of autonomy and, as such, it is also clearly a crime, but
perhaps it is also, as borne out by countless women’s experience, much more
besides. As many have argued, nonconsensual sex is or can also be a political act
predicated upon and then reaffirming a woman’s physical insecurity and hence
her civic and political inequality. It seems to intersect in some still unclear way
with many women’s and some men’s civil rights to equality, and perhaps with
their constitutional rights to equal protection of laws. And, when prevalent on
college campuses, nonconsensual sex is also an educational wrong: Particularly
when unaddressed, its occurrence, the threat of its occurrence, and its repeated
occurrence violate a woman’s civil right to equal educational opportunity, as
guaranteed by Title IX of our Civil Rights Acts. These crimes, in other words,
are also civil rights violations, when they are committed on campus or when
they interfere with the enjoyment of equality of educational opportunities.
Accusations of sexual assault on campus, however, also present civil rights
challenges. These accusations of rape or assault, typically but not always
brought by a female college student against a male student, whatever else
they do, generally trigger campus disciplinary processes against the accused
student. Those disciplinary proceedings in turn provide some procedural
and substantive safeguards for falsely accused students, but those safeguards
unquestionably fall short of the civil and constitutional protections offered
defendants in criminal cases charged with similar wrongs. This is not as
shocking as it may first seem: What is at stake, after all, in these college and
university disciplinary proceedings is not the abridgment of liberty occasioned
by jail time, as in a state criminal case, but a disciplinary sanction—at worst
expulsion from the college. Nevertheless, that sanction—expulsion—is hugely
consequential for the individuals so charged, and for that reason alone the
disciplinary procedures that threaten to impose it have become an object of
considerable anguish and protest and organized resistance, not only by accused
students, but also by their advocates on the faculties and in the administrations
of the schools charged with the duties of complying with Title IX’s mandate
of equal education opportunities.4 At the end of this essay I will return to this
vexed subject—the threat to the equal educational opportunities that Title IX
promised that is posed by nonconsensual sex on campus, and the challenge
to various moral if not constitutionally required rights of due process and fair
hearing posed by the disciplinary proceedings we have devised to respond
to allegations that such sex has occurred. I want to ultimately suggest what I
4.
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hope might be one way—not sufficient, but nevertheless I think one way, and
a way that might be necessary—to address the problem of nonconsensual sex
on college campuses in a way that respects the educational aspirations of all
of us—ourselves, our sons, our daughters, our teachers and our students—and
that are either frustrated or realized on these campuses that we all so cherish.
We do not want to either experience or remember, or have experienced or
remembered by those we love, our campuses as either places of soul-killing
threat and danger, or as places of unwarranted persecution and manifest
injustice.
So, toward the end of this essay, I will briefly return to the subject of this
symposium: the occurrence of, the accusations of, and the disciplining of
nonconsensual sex, assault, rape on college campuses. First, though, I want
to change the subject, somewhat. I would like to focus these remarks not on
nonconsensual sex on campus—not on rape, and not on sexual assault—and not
on the adequacy or inadequacy of campus responses to the possible occurrence
of those crimes—but rather on something that our conversations about
nonconsensual sex have often marginalized, and that is the harms occasioned
by sex that is fully consensual and entirely nonassaultive, but unwanted, or
not mutually desired, by both partners. I want to focus, that is, not on rape, or
the definition of rape, or the sufficiency of nonconsent as a definition of rape,
or the harms of rape, but rather, on sex that is not rape and not regarded by
rape as anyone: sex that is consensual, legal, and not a violation of anyone’s
civil rights, but is nevertheless unwanted and unwelcome. I want to discuss,
briefly, the possible harms that sex might occasion. To be more precise: I want
to discuss “nonconsensual but unwanted sex,” by which I mean sex that is
consensual on both sides, but which one party does not physically desire and
does not emotionally welcome, and which is not pleasurable. I want to argue
that the party who does not physically desire, does not emotionally welcome,
and does not take pleasure in sex has sometimes been harmed by that sex
by virtue of its unwelcomeness, and that the harm is serious enough that we
need to attend to it. Further—the harms caused by this sex are not simply
psychological or emotional. They are political. The sufferance of unwanted,
undesired, unpleasurable, and unwelcome—albeit consensual—sex over time
can undermine a woman’s or man’s equality in a social and legal world that
presupposes the moral as well as legal sufficiency of consent as a measure of
subjective well-being.
Before setting out that claim, though, why does consensual but unwanted
sex even happen? Why might a young woman, or a young man, or a mature
woman or man, consent to sex—whether with an occasional partner, or a
boyfriend, or a spouse—she does not want? Let me narrow the focus first to
heterosexual penetrative sex, unwanted by the woman who consents to it, and
then I’ll refocus more broadly. As most women who have been heterosexually
active for any part of their adult or teenage lives know, girls and women—and
sometimes but less often men and boys—consent to sex they do not want, do
not welcome, do not desire, from which they do not anticipate feeling any
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pleasure, and from which they feel no pleasure, for any number of deeply
familiar, although rarely discussed, reasons. A young woman in college or
a girl in high school or middle school may consent to sex she doesn’t want
because of peer pressure, or to ward off a boyfriend’s foul mood, or to retain a
high-status boyfriend’s affection. A woman with children who is economically
dependent on a man may do so to ensure that her partner will pay the rent or
leave enough money for the kids’ school lunches the next day or to forestall his
real or threatened violence should she not consent. A woman in a threatening
environment who fears violent sex from some quarter may consent to sex
she does not want with a man whom she may not desire but whom she does
believe will protect her, and thus represents the lesser of evils: She consents
to unwanted sex with one man to ward off the danger of rape by another. A
girl or woman at any point in her education may do so to ensure that she will
receive a deserved or an undeserved high grade in a class, just as a worker
may do for a promotion or pay raise on a job—which may then be a Title VII
or Title IX violation. Obviously, and perhaps most pervasively, a woman or
girl may consent to undesired, unwanted, and unwelcome sex because her
material security depends on it. Throughout time and globally, women have
consented to sex they don’t want, don’t welcome, and from which they derive
no pleasure because they quite correctly believe their religion demands it of
them, or because they believe it is their obligation as a wife to do so, or because
they believe, correctly, that their communities expect it of them. And so on.
In virtually none of these scenarios has the woman been raped; in all these
cases she has consented—including the one in which she worries about a vague
threat of violence in the future. The threat conveyed by a combination of size
and athleticism plus a menacing manner or the lack of transportation home
or the prospect of walking in an unfamiliar neighborhood or the danger of
violent sexual assault by others is not itself sufficient to make the sex that
ensues a crime. In all these scenarios, though, the woman or girl has consented
to sex that she does not physically desire, does not emotionally welcome, and
does not find pleasurable. Consensual but unwanted sex, both within and
outside marriage, and both on campuses and off, is ubiquitous. And of course,
when consensual but unwanted sex is followed by a consensual but unwanted
pregnancy, the harm occasioned by that sex is magnified.
I want to suggest here that this unwanted but consensual sex—on campus
and off—can carry with it its own distinctive harms that are related to, but
different from, the harms occasioned by rape. Our focus on nonconsensual
sex, coerced sex, forced sex, sexual assault, and rape, therefore, tends to at best
marginalize and at worst to legitimate these quite widespread experiences, and
mute or forestall discussion of the harms that these sexual experiences might
cause. The focus particularly on consent as the marker of both legal and moral
sex, and on nonconsent as the marker of both injury and criminality, runs the
risk of virtually defining the harms caused by consensual sex out of existence,
or at least minimizing their significance.
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So, in the remainder of this essay, I will make three major claims about
consensual but unwanted sex and suggest steps we might take, culturally,
to interrupt those harms. First, I will argue that consensual, nonassaultive,
but nevertheless unwanted sex can nevertheless be harmful in spite of its
consensuality, and that those harms are borne disproportionately but by
no means exclusively by women. Although it’s a mouthful, I want to label
the cluster of harms occasioned by such sex as “dysphoric” and the political
condition it entails “consensual sexual dysphoria.” Like all dysphoric
conditions, this one occasions an alienation from and a profound discomfort
within one’s body. Second, I will argue that the dysphoric harms occasioned
by consensual but unwanted sex are not only psychologically debilitating but
also political. The experience of unwanted sex occasions an alienation of the
choosing self from the integrity of the body. That alienation undermines one’s
sense of physical security in the social world, and hence one’s equality in it.
Third, I will suggest some reasons—grounded in presuppositions of liberalism,
libertarian politics, political theory, and feminism—that these dysphoric harms
of consensual sex are so peculiarly invisible to us in our contemporary legalsexual and cultural-sexual climate.
After spelling out these claims, I will return briefly to the subject of sexual
assault on campus, and our seemingly intractable and stalemated debates over
how to fairly deal with these accusations when they arise. I want to suggest
that in addition to whatever might be the harms occasioned by consensual
but unwanted sex, the ubiquity of that sex may have contributed to the rise of
all forms of sexual assault, including nonconsensual sex and rape, on college
campuses as well as off. Therefore, if we want to address the causes of the
spike in the number of accusations of unwanted sex, as well as simply respond
with disciplinary actions when these accusations are made, we should perhaps
attend to the apparent ubiquity of unwanted consensual sex: By attending to
the latter, and its causes, we may actually drive down the number of assaultive
sexual crimes on campus and off.
In my conclusion I will sum up my normative claim, to wit, that one major
but largely unattended and undertheorized condition for the morality—
although not the legality—of consensual sex is that it be mutually desired or
welcomed. Consent may be enough to make sex legal, but it is not enough to
make the sex good, in any sense of the word “good.” Sex must be mutually
welcomed for it to be moral, for it to be ethical, for it to be truly in your interest,
for it to be aligned with your own dignity, for it not to sap your strength,
for it to be consistent with your own worth, and yes, for it to bolster rather
than undermine your social and political equality. So the lesson we should be
teaching ourselves and our young children and teenagers is to not have sex
unless both partners desire or welcome it—even if both are consenting, willing,
or game. That straightforward change in our sexual education, our sexual
ethics, and hence our sexual culture might go some way toward mitigating the
harms of an otherwise unbound libertarian sexual ethic that now dominates
our sexual discourse, culture, and actions both on campuses and off. That
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libertarianism has come to entail, for too many, a mandate that coerces—albeit
not violently and not typically with force—sexual compliance. It is a mandate
that serves the interests of the powerful, in the sexual sphere as in so many
others, not by overcoming the will, but by extracting the consent, of the weak.
The Harms of Unwanted Consensual Sex
So what are the harms of unwanted sex? When I first started writing about
this in the early nineties, virtually no research existed on the subject. That is
no longer true: In the past fifteen years, empirically minded social workers,
psychologists, and sociologists have begun to look at some of the harms caused
by the sufferance of unwanted consensual sex, at least among college-age
women—and in a way that carefully distinguishes those harms from the harms
caused by nonconsensual sex, or rape, which has been the subject of intense
and extensive study for at least fifty years.5 The work is still in its infancy, but it
is growing. To summarize: According to a number of studies—perhaps a dozen,
total—young middle school and high school girls and college and university
women who engage in unwanted but consensual sex disproportionately suffer
from depression and related psychological and emotional harms; they are less
likely to use or insist upon birth control, so they are more likely to also suffer
unwanted pregnancies; and they have reduced self-esteem and sexual agency.
The empirical research is welcome and overdue, but it is also still limited,
both in terms of the number of such studies and in their scope and depth.
In particular, what has not been studied is the possibility that the sufferance
of all of that unwanted consensual sex—what Shari Motro calls “sex against
desire,” (or SAD, for short)6—regardless of the age of the women or men who
engage in it, might carry distinctly political and psychic harms, in addition to
the emotional harms to self-esteem and health that have been studied to date.
5.

A growing body of social sciences scholarship focuses on unwanted sex engaged in by
college students and young adults of both sexes, some of it inspired by and informed by
feminist concerns that the willingness of young women to consent to sex they do not want is a
function of gender role stereotyping. Emily A. Impett & Letitia Anne Peplau, Why Some Women
Consent to Unwanted Sex with a Dating Partner: Insights from Attachment Theory, 26 Psychol. Women
Q. 360 (2002); Sarah J. Walker, When “No” Becomes “Yes”: Why Girls and Women Consent to Unwanted
Sex, 6 Applied & Preventive Psychol. 157 (1997); Susan Sprecher et al., Token Resistance to
Sexual Intercourse and Consent to Unwanted Sexual Intercourse: College Students’ Dating Experience in Three
Countries, 31 J. Sex Res. 125 (1994); Lucia F. O’Sullivan & Elizabeth R. Allgeier, Feigning Sexual
Desire: Consenting to Unwanted Sexual Activity in Heterosexual Dating Relationships, 35 J. Sex Res. 234
(1998); Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Stephen W. Cook, Men’s self-reports of unwanted sexual
activity, 24 J. Sex Res. 58 (1988); Miriam Lewin, Unwanted Intercourse: The Difficulty of Saying No,
9 Psychol. Women Q. 184 (1995); Pamela I. Erickson & Andrea J. Rapkin, Unwanted Sexual
Experiences Among Middle and High School Youth, 12 J. Adolescent Health 319 (1991). I have
found only one article on the propensity of married women to consent to sex they don’t
want, and that involves young married brides in India. K.G. Santhya, Nicole Haberland, F.
Ram, R.K. Sinha & S.K. Mohanty, Consent and Coercion: Examining Unwanted Sex Among Married
Young Women in India, 33 Int’l Fam. Plan. Persp. 124 (2007).

6.

See Shari Motro, Scholarship Against Desire, 27 Yale J.L. & Human. 115 (2015). The phrase
originates with Marcia Douglass & Lisa Douglass, The Sex You Want: A Lovers’ Guide
to Women’s Sexual Pleasure 110 (2002).
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Those psychic and political harms have not been so closely studied by either
social scientists or social workers, although they are obliquely evidenced in
one extraordinary but still unpublished qualitative study of unwanted sex by
Alyson Spurgas, a feminist sociologist.7 And they are much more explicitly
and extensively discussed in feminist autobiographies and memoirs, perhaps
most powerfully, but certainly not exclusively, by the late Andrea Dworkin,
and more recently in feminist blogs and web pages.8 What might they be?
Let me start with the psychic harm, which I am calling “sexual dysphoria.”
When we consent to any change in our world, but particularly when we
consent to transactional changes in our world—when in a market economy
we buy a consumer product, or take a college course, or commence a job—it
is widely presumed, in theory and practice both, that the change increases the
well-being and promotes the interest of he or she who consented. There is,
in other words, a presumed correlation between the increase in our objective
wealth when we consent to a transaction and an increase in our subjective
well-being, happiness, or pleasure. That is, indeed, the entire justification of
not just market economies, but also of what I have elsewhere called and will
below refer to as an “ethic of consent” that broadly underscores the moral view
behind liberalism itself. But what if, contrary to this definitional presumption
of an increase in well-being resulting from consensual transactions, there just
isn’t? Isn’t an increase in felt well-being? Not really. Not subjectively. Yeah,
we bought the couch, but we don’t much like it. “Buyer’s remorse.” But what
if it is more intense? What if the trade or bargain or change to which we’ve
consented and committed ourselves leaves us not just remorseful over a bad
purchase, but miserable? What if the work we’ve agreed to perform for a wage
leaves us sickly and suffering or bored and disabled? What if the consumer
product we’ve agreed to buy leaves us not just unsatisfied with the product,
but with nothing but a residue of dissatisfaction?
The result, I suggest, is a disconnect, or a disjuncture, or a dysphoric
relationship between our objectively understood individual interest, as
measured by our individual wealth—which again definitionally is increased
with every single consensual trade we ever enter into—and our subjectively
7.

Alyson Spurgas’s work on the gendered implications of changing diagnoses of women’s
sexual desire “disorders,” and the implications of those diagnoses for women’s political
lives, is most promising. See, e.g., Alyson Spurgas, Interest, Arousal, and Shifting Diagnoses of Female
Sexual Dysfunction, or: How Women Learn about Desire, 14 Stud. Gender & Sexuality 187 (2013)
[hereinafter Spurgas, Interest]; Alyson Kay Spurgas, Circuits of Desire: Science, Therapy,
Trauma, Femininity (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New York)
(available at CUNY Academic Works, http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/387);
Alyson Spurgas, Low Desire, Trauma and Femininity in the DSM-5: A Case for Sequelae, 7 Psychol.
& Sexuality 48 (2013); Alyson Spurgas, Sexual Carework and Feminine Socialization in
Intimate Relationships: Embodied Invisible Labor Among Low-Desiring Women (Aug.
2015) (paper presented at Annual Conference of the American Sociological Association)
(on file with author).

8.

See Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse (1987). For contemporary legal-feminist analyses of
unwanted consensual sex, see Motro, supra note 6, and Susan Appleton, Toward a “Culturally
Cliterate” Family Law?, 23 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 267 (2008).
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experienced, and experiencing, hedonic selves: the selves, that is, who
experience pain and pleasure, who feel the wind at our backs or the gale-force
hurricane in our faces, who feel comforted or who suffer blows to our natural
bodies when touched, who thrive when healthy and who sicken and die,
who are either bored or humiliated at work, or who thrill to their workplace
accomplishments, who love and nurture those children so fully consensually
brought into the world, or who can be so wounded by them. A disconnection
between the presumed increase in the well-being of the transactional self that
is assumed to follow from the transactional exchange and a felt increase not
in well-being but in misery of the hedonic self might alienate us from the
latter. When that disconnection is dramatic or extreme, I call that condition
“dysphoria”: an alienation and disorienting dislocation, or discomfort, with
the evidence of our subjective, desiring, pained selves.
When we consent to a change in our sexual world—when a heterosexual
woman consents, for example, to penetration and intercourse—again, as
with any transaction, it is presumed that that consensual change will leave
her better off and, more specifically, with a net increase in physical pleasure:
that the consensual transaction increases her felt physical pleasure and her felt
satisfactions along with her overall well-being or welfare. But again, what if it
doesn’t? What if she reaps not pleasure or satisfaction but pain and discomfort
and boredom and invasion and alienation from the sexual transaction to which
she has consented, and which is therefore presumed to increase her overall
net satisfactions in life? The result of that disjunction is an alienation not
only from felt subjective life, as described above, but an alienation from her
most profoundly embodied subjective hedonic life—it is a disjunction, after all,
between the felt pleasures and pains of her body and the presumed pleasures
and pains of her body, and the body’s interiority at that. You’re supposed to
be and you’re presumed to be feeling pleasure, but instead you’re feeling pain.
One way to resolve the dissonance is by occupying, so to speak, the
thinking, rational, calculating transactional self—the self that calculates benefit
by reference to the exchange value of consensual transactions—and alienating
the hedonic self, or crudely by squelching the latter in deference to the former.
The pained, subjective, feeling self, in other words, gets the blunt end of the
stick. The resulting alienation of the feeling, experiencing, hedonic self, and
of that self’s significance, is what I’m calling consensual sexual dysphoria. It is
an alienation from one’s own physical and sexual desires, pains, and pleasures
as a distinctive guide to one’s own sexual self-interest and well-being. The
alienation of that self, I suggest, can have lifelong debilitating consequences.
And now, the political dimension of this. I can find no empirical research on
this question.9 Nevertheless, there may be a cluster of distinct, albeit related,
9.

Spurgas’s work alludes to these harms, but doesn’t spell them out in detail. She refers to
the general phenomenon I am addressing in the text as the “husbandry” of female sexuality,
and hence of female bodies. Spurgas, Interest, supra note 7, at 205. Andrea Dworkin’s work
on intercourse can largely be read as a study of the undocumented and largely undiscussed
political harms of consensual and unwanted sex as distinct from the much more studied
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political harms, as well as psychic harms, incident to consensual sexual
dysphoria. They might be partly inferred simply from the divergence between
the nature of the “self” so constructed by these consensual choices and the
nature of the “self” presupposed by liberalism and neoliberalism. First, as with
the woman who carries an unwanted pregnancy, one’s physical integrity and
sense of self as having physical integrity is invaded when opening oneself up,
physically and literally, not only to penetrative sex but to other forms of sex as
well, that one does not want and does not find pleasurable. The penetrated
body becomes, to that degree, fluid, or porous. The body becomes boundaryless in ways that are inconsistent with—I think violently inconsistent with—the
conception of the boundaried body that is vitally central to liberal theory. One
is creating a “self” through one’s consensual choices that is inconsistent with
the unified and boundaried self-presupposed by liberalism itself. So the first
harm of consensual but unwanted sex is to the boundedness, and integrity, of
the liberal body.
Second, and again like the woman who bears an unwanted pregnancy,
a woman or girl who consents to unwanted sex compromises her selfsovereignty: She willfully subjugates her body and her will to someone else’s.
She acts in ways inconsistent with her own desire, and not in furtherance of
her own pleasure. And here again, the “self” she creates through these choices
stands in contrast to the willing, choosing, and preferring “self” assumed by
but also partly constructed by liberalism, the self with desires and pleasures
that are manifested in preferences, choices, and acts. The woman consenting
to undesired sex, by contrast, prefers, chooses, and acts on the basis of her
partner’s pleasures and desires rather than her own. Although we can’t impose
our desires upon the actions and choices of other free agents in the world,
it is a hallmark of contemporary liberalism to insist that we can do precisely
that with respect to our own bodies: that the choices we make, which we
then effectuate through bodily movement, are presumed to reflect our own
preferences, pleasures, and pains, not those of others. So a woman who
consents to sex she does not want and from which she derives no pleasure is
willing away her self-sovereignty in a profoundly physical and illiberal sense:
She is committing her body to the satiation of the desires and the fulfillment
of the preferences of someone else.
Third, a girl or woman who consents to sex she does not want is stunting
her own autonomy when she subordinates her own hedonic ends to those
of another. She is simply not choosing a future course of action that will
promote her interests, pleasures, or satiate her desires; she is choosing a future
course, again, that promotes the interests, pleasures, and desires of another.
And finally, her own moral integrity is undermined if she lies to her partner
and herself about her own pleasures or reasons for consenting to the sex she
doesn’t want. Physical integrity, moral integrity, autonomy, self-sovereignty,
harms of rape. See Dworkin, supra note 8. An extensive discussion of the value, lack of value,
or possible harms of engaging in “maintenance sex”—unwanted consensual sex necessary to
maintain an intimate relationship—can be found on feminist blogs, including Jezebel.
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and self-possession are all central components of the liberal, political self.
When women and girls willfully relinquish them in their sexual lives they
are in effect relinquishing their entitlement to the enjoyment as well as the
challenges of that widely lauded, widely expected—and intensely political—
way of being in the social world.
Women in long-term relationships who routinely and over time—
sometimes over the course of an entire adult lifetime—consent to unwanted
and unpleasurable sex are likely harmed all the more profoundly. A mature
woman’s physical integrity—her ownership of her body’s boundaries—is
obviously far more severely compromised if she quite literally and routinely
and even as a matter of self-identity opens up her body in service of another’s
pleasures, will, and ends over the course of adulthood. That permeable, fluid
body, after all, defines her adult body, not just her occasional participation in
casual sex. Likewise, a mature woman’s agency and sense of agency will be
even more badly compromised than the college student’s if she routinely, and
over years, puts herself and her body to the work of participating in an activity
she does not want or welcome.
It is simply hard to imagine a healthy sense of one’s own agency either
developing or being sustained over the course of an adult life in which a woman
as a matter of identity and habit bends her will regarding her own body for
the sake of another’s physical pleasure. The “self” as understood by liberal
thought—meaning a self that both constitutes and asserts a unity of choice,
desire, pleasure, and preference— might be badly diminished in long-term
relationships in which a woman habitually and over years acts and chooses
to act, against the teaching of her own pleasures, preferences, and desires,
and instead on the basis of and reflecting the physical pleasures, desires, and
preferences of her partner.
So, these are the clusters of harms, or the types of harms, I want to
collectively call “dysphoric”: the damage done to a woman’s or girl’s sense of
physical integrity, autonomy, self-sovereignty, and moral integrity by virtue of
her consensual commission of her body in sex she does not desire and from
which she receives no pleasure. Of course, we all, in the course of our lives,
make choices to use our bodies in ways that we fervently hope will maximize
the well-being of others—others whom we love, or admire, whom we willingly
and happily serve, or to whom for whatever reason we are or feel obligated.
We make our children’s lunches in the morning, we go to work all day at jobs
we may abhor, we change diapers and clean our houses, we care for our elderly
parents, and so on, and in all of these activities we use our bodies in ways
that don’t directly contribute to our pleasure, and may very well intensify the
pleasure of others. And that may be why we do it. We don’t, though, routinely
do these daily and loving tasks in such a way as to render our bodies passive
vehicles for the physical pleasure of others, with no expectation of our own
pleasure. And these are not activities the understood point of which is and
should be pleasure and affection, while the felt reality is displeasure, pain, and
alienation. Nor are they as physically invasive: When we make lunches and cut
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the lawn and clean the house, we are not using our bodies in ways that leave us
physically invaded and vulnerable to impregnation.
When we do these tasks, we are not doing them in ways that directly alienate
us from our own bodies and the pleasures and pains they sustain, precisely in
a field of action in which pleasure is or should be the point, or close to it. We
don’t, when we do these loving tasks for others, turn our bodies over so that our
bodies themselves become tools for the fulfillment of the desires, preferences,
actions, and choices of others. We don’t do them in ways that so compromise
our physical integrity, self-possession, self-sovereignty and moral integrity,
or in ways that so profoundly sever the connection between pleasure, desire,
preference, choice, and act. We don’t do so in ways that leave us so thoroughly
alienated from the functionality of our own bodies as united with our own
desires, pleasures, pains, choices, actions, hopes, ambitions, and futures. We
don’t do so, in short, in ways that promote such a deep, albeit consensual,
dysphoric sense of strangeness, and alienation, from our own physicality.
What I want to stress, which I believe goes beyond the claims made in
the empirical literature on the psychological harms occasioned by unwanted
consensual sex, is the possibility that these dysphoric harms to selfhood
sustained either occasionally by girls and boys and young men and women,
or, over time and more persistently, by mature women, could and should
be characterized as political, and not only psychic. All of them collectively—
the compromise of sovereignty, of physical integrity, of autonomy, and of
integrity—undermine the unity of self that is central to liberalism: a self that
forms preferences on the basis of one’s desires, then forms choices on the basis
of those preferences, and then takes actions on the basis of those choices. The
liberal self quintessentially acts in the world in a way that reflects and is deeply
rooted in desire, as mediated through preference and choice. The woman
who habitually consents to unwanted sex, and then sometimes to unwanted
pregnancy, by contrast, acts in the world in a way that reflects, is rooted in, and
then serves the sexual desires, sexual preferences, and sexual needs of others,
and then the survival and biological needs of fetal life.
Now, of course, a woman or man who engages in hotly desired sex, or a
woman who undertakes a fiercely desired pregnancy, also is performing a mode
of selfhood that is at odds with liberal presuppositions: a pregnant woman’s
selfhood and a partner’s boundaries in sex are fused with the needs, interests,
passions, and desires of the other in non- and illiberal ways. In fact, just that
fusion, I have argued elsewhere and repeatedly, is a poignant and persistent
and vitally important reminder of the fallacy and the partiality of liberalism
itself. When pregnancy or sex is wanted, the experience of pregnancy and
the experience of sex are both profoundly important counterexamples to the
overdrawn atomism of liberal individualism. We value and treasure those
experiences largely for just that reason. When they are not wanted, though,
that fusion, that blurring of self, that loss of boundary, that relinquishment
of physical and moral integrity, that immersion of one’s self in the interests
and needs and ends of the other––is not poignant in the slightest; it is, rather,
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to quote Mark Kelman’s description of a quite different phenomenon—it is,
rather, just an oppression. Desire makes all the difference.
How do these harms become political? Why might they have political
repercussions? Briefly: A woman who routinely engages in unpleasurable,
unwanted, and unwelcome sexual activity, even if consensual, and marital or
not, might come to regard herself, and others may regard her likewise, as being
in effect the “kind of person” who has no physical integrity; who might of
course have pleasures and pains, but whose pleasures and pains are irrelevant
or marginal to her body’s actions; who may have and act on her own choices,
but whose choices do not reflect her own desires; and who obviously has a
body, but one that exists for the purpose of another’s sexual fulfillment. As
this becomes normalized and routinized, she may become that much less a
“liberal subject”: She may become that much less a person who is prepared and
presumed to interact in a world in which a subject’s consent to actions, trades,
bargains, and institutions track the subject’s preferences and her desires. She
consents to all this sex, but that consent—her consent—does not, at least in a
very important dimension of her life, track her own preferences and desires
rather than her partner’s. This is a different political harm than the harm done
to a woman who has been raped: The woman who consents to unwanted sex is
acting and experiencing herself as acting in a way that is contrary to the unity
that we assume in the liberal self—a unity of desire and preference and choice,
or action.
The political harm of consensual unwanted sex, then, if this is right, is
that the woman’s or girl’s capacity to live as a “liberal self” is badly undercut.
Quite plausibly, although again there’s no research on this, at least that I can
find, that might in turn limit both her viability and her potency in a liberal
world hardly designed to accommodate someone so constituted. She becomes
an illiberal subject in a liberal world. It may not be quite so surprising that
such illiberal women in liberal societies have a greater tendency toward selfabnegation, self-denial, sacrifice, and altruism than their more atomistic
husbands, brothers, fathers, and sons. It may not be so surprising, even, that
they don’t raise their hands in law school classes very often and that they aren’t
very adept at bargaining for a decent price when buying a new or used car. All
of that unwanted sex to which women and girls and less often men and boys
consent might be part of the problem, and for that reason alone, if no other, it
should count as a harm. Again, the libertarian’s valorization of autonomous
sex is seemingly blind to it.
The Invisibility of Dysphoric Sexual Harms
So, why? Why are these dysphoric harms of unwanted consensual sex—both
the psychic and the political—so invisible? Why are those harms so invisible to
what Gerald Bradley and Robert George, in a debate on related topics twenty
years ago, fruitfully called the “liberal imagination”?10 I think there are at least
10.

Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 Geo. L.J. 301
(1995).
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six major reasons, which I’ll briefly name and then offer a very quick note on
each: first, liberalism itself, and its valorization of consent as a guide to wellbeing; second, sexual libertarianism, and its valorization of sex as an almost
axiomatic human good; third, the deep structures of feminist thought, and
its embrace of either liberty or equality, rather than subjective well-being, as
guides to political action; fourth, our culturewide overinvestment in legalism,
and our aversion to moralism, as concomitant to our commitment to individual
liberty; fifth, philosophically, the disavowal of hedonic life as a guide to wellbeing and self-interest; and sixth, politically, sexism, pure and simple. I’ll
comment briefly on each.
The first of these—liberalism itself, and its valorization of consent—has little
or nothing to do with sex, but has everything to do with consent, and with
the role consent now plays in political and legal liberalism, or to some of its
variants. As I’ve argued elsewhere, the very idea of “consensual harms,” in
some economically grounded versions of liberalism, is virtually oxymoronic:
Consent is widely regarded within economic liberal theory as the mechanism
by which value is created, with the consequence that consensuality precludes
the possibility—and hence visibility—of harms that may be caused by any
consensual transaction. Pareto-optimal transactions just can’t be harmful,
and consensual sex, whatever else it is, is pareto-optimal. Consensuality is
also central, though, to some libertarian as well as feminist interpretations of
liberalism: The free or autonomous individual, for the libertarian and liberal
feminist, simply is the individual who chooses between options, whether in
economic or political or intimate markets. For noneconomic libertarians and
liberal feminists, then, consent is emblematic of as well as constitutive of
autonomy; consent itself is a sort of intrinsic as well as instrumental good. If
consensual transactions are intrinsically good, then obviously the same is true
of consensual sexual transactions. Increasing the number and availability of
opportunities for consensual sexual transactions increases not only the wealth
of the world, as per the economic legalist, but the autonomy of the world
likewise, as per the libertarian.
Sex, however, is also distinctively and peculiarly valorized within
contemporary liberalism, and so consensual sex is all the more so: Consensual
sex, then, combines the prima facie value of consensuality with the prima facie
value of sex. Sex, in the “liberal imagination,” to borrow again the expression
from Stephen Macedo and Robert George’s exchange, and as Tom Grey argued
some time ago, is decidedly not the product of “dark forces,” the repression of
which makes civilization itself possible.11 Rather, sex, in the modern liberal
imagination, is about as non-Freudian as sex can possibly be: Sex, contra Freud,
is expressive, private, universal, a matter of taste, generative of pleasure,
and imposing no or few costs on others. Sexual moralisms that assume to
the contrary have imposed irrational and profound harms on vast swaths
of the community, and for no sensible reason—as modern or contemporary
liberals from Bertrand Russell to H.L.A. Hart to Michel Foucault to David
11.
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Richards and to Stephen Macedo have all, in different ways, argued. So long
as consensual, there simply are no further conditions for the morality of sex.
So, the idea that sex also ought to be mutually desired as well as mutually
consensual—not only in the workplace but everywhere—just doesn’t enter the
picture. Consent is moral condition enough.
Third: These harms disappear, in part, because of the structures of
contemporary feminism. Liberal feminism, still by far the most dominant
form of feminism, both culturally and legally, tends to follow liberalism
in identifying wrongs to women with violations of consensual ethics.
For centuries, after all, women were indeed harmed by virtue of roles and
responsibilities and infirmities imposed upon them without their consent and
against their will, from rape itself to involuntary pregnancy and motherhood.
Insistence on the necessity of consent, however, has carried an unfortunate
and unwarranted inference: From the insistence on the necessity of women’s
consent to the institutions and cultures that frame their lives, liberal feminists,
that would be most of us, have too quickly assumed the sufficiency of that
consent as well. If we chose it, whether the “it” be pregnancy, motherhood,
careerism, or heterosexual intercourse, we wrongly conclude that it simply
must be an improvement in our well-being, since the imposition of those
institutions and conditions without our consent so manifestly was not. But,
of course, this doesn’t follow; again, consent is just not enough to ensure
goodness, even if the lack of it is quite bad indeed. The goodness of work
doesn’t follow from the wrongness of slavery, the goodness of commerce
doesn’t follow from the wrongness of theft, and, likewise, the goodness of sex
doesn’t follow from the wrongness of rape. Liberal feminists, in short, have
been far too quick to acquiesce in the value of consensual sexual relations,
an acquiescence originating in an unjustified inference from the wrongness of
coercive imposition.
Radical feminism, still the most significant counter to liberal feminism, has
not proved here to be a corrective. Radical feminists have tended to view that
which harms women not in terms of nonconsent or infringements of liberty,
but rather in terms of unequal power and coercion. In the context of sexual
harms, this has led to what I have elsewhere called a “coercion tunnel”: Radical
feminists are attuned to a broad range of harms, but tend to ascribe them
causally to some coercive force.12 This leads to an unfortunate syllogism: If
something is felt or experienced as harmful, then it simply must be because of
coercion. In the context of sex, this is the kernel of truth behind the common
enough charge that radical feminism is committed to the proposition that “all
sex is rape”: If sex is felt as harmful, then it must be coercive, and if coercive,
then it must then be rape, or close to it. But the premise of this syllogism—that
if sex is harmful, it must be coercive—is as fallacious as the twinned liberal
claim that if sex is consensual it must be good. Harm no more implies the
presence of coercion than it implies the absence of consent. Consent is not
12.
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enough to render sex good, but coercion is not the necessary precondition
of harm. If we’re consenting to a condition or activity that harms us, that
condition or activity is neither necessarily nonconsensual nor necessarily
coerced. It nevertheless may be injurious.
Fourth is legalism itself. Large swaths of contemporary culture, by no
means all, tend to equate the legal with the good, with the consequence being
that harms not consequent to crimes or torts or at least civil rights violations
are not cognizable. These harms are of that sort: Sex to which we consent,
but which we do not desire, is not going to be the proper object of either
criminal or tort law, and is not, absent other circumstances, a violation of civil
rights either—it is actionable harassment only if it is a quid pro quo that occurs
in the workplace or the school, and interferes with a woman’s paycheck or
grade transcript. I am not arguing here for an expansion of either criminal
law, tort law or civil rights regimes. It’s worth noting, though, that here as
elsewhere in liberal societies it’s what’s legal, not what’s illegal, that might be
most hurtful, because here as elsewhere it is what’s legal, not what’s criminal,
that is ubiquitous, largely invisible, and the instrumentality of the exercise of
significant power.
Fifth—these harms are invisible because they are harms to our hedonic
selves, and we are in a cultural and intellectual moment that counsels a distrust
of those selves as having either political or moral salience as guides to our
well-being. Utilitarians, in their quest for general happiness, gave up the ghost
long ago of any reliance on actual pleasure and pain as guides to individual
well-being, turning instead to the maximization of satisfied preferences and
the fulfillment of individual choice—paving the way for the late-twentiethcentury economic movement toward wealth, rather than subjective well-being,
as that which we should aim to increase in both our public policy and our
private lives. Nonutilitarian moral theorists are even more deeply distrustful
of hedonic life as a guide to moral action, positing pain, pleasure, and desire
as distractions from a studied focus on principle and rationality as the most
humanly distinctive and morally ambitious guide to an ethically sound life.
From within politics, and political theory, Marxists and other critical thinkers
have been notoriously distrustful of subjective desire, always alert to the
possibility that such desire may be false because coopted by hierarchic powers,
as a guide to well-being. Conservative moral theorists and traditionalists have
been no kinder, seeing in pain and pleasure and desire little but infantile urges
waiting to be tethered to socially and historically sanctioned purposes. Harms
that are sustained by our hedonic selves are not going to register as either
meaningful objects of moral concern or guides to moral action by virtually
any of these moral traditions—which do constitute, in toto, the sum total of our
contemporary moral teachings.
And finally, these harms may be as invisible as they are because it is women
and girls who disproportionately sustain them. Our shared tendency to ignore
the hedonic costs of sexual dysphoria might simply continue the centurieslong trajectory of women’s pains and pleasures, particularly in our sexual and

Consensual Sexual Dysphoria: A Challenge for Campus Life

819

reproductive lives, just not mattering much. Women’s pains and pleasures
don’t much register, and never have, as intellectually interesting, medically
imperative, politically salient, or morally significant. Not to put too fine a
point on it, but they don’t matter much, and haven’t mattered much, primarily
because of the political power of those who profit by ignoring them.
So: That the hedonic injuries suffered through consensual but unwanted
sex go relatively unnoticed is mightily overdetermined. Societally, they are
rendered invisible by liberalism’s embrace of consent rather than well-being
as a guide to policy; culturally, by sexual libertarians’ insistence on sexuality
as a near-absolute good; politically, by feminism’s commitments to liberty and
equality, roughly, rather than happiness or flourishing, as political goals that
will further the well-being of women; intellectually, by political philosophers’
collective distrust of subjective experiences, and particularly experiences of
pain, pleasure, and desire, as guides to critical moral and political thought;
and historically, by our collective and millennium-long discounting of the
moral significance of women’s subjective experience across the board, but
particularly women’s experiences of subjective pain.
To get to the other side of all of this requires some heavy lifting. It requires
a willful disavowal of some of the teachings of our intellectual traditions,
some critical distance on our consensual choices, some reawakening of a
moral sense grounded in sympathy, pain, and pleasure, rather than principle,
some old-fashioned consciousness-raising, and perhaps some new-fashioned
mindfulness. But the journey may be worth taking. What’s at stake may be not
only a modicum of sexual health, but also, more ambitiously, a reacquaintance
with our hedonic selves as a reliable guide to our own and one another’s wellbeing, and a bit of warranted skepticism about our multiple traditions, from
across the political spectrum and through so many of our modern intellectual
traditions as well, that teaches a honed contempt for those selves as worthy of
moral action, contemplation, or sympathy.
Conclusion: Sexual Dysphoria and Rape on Campus
Finally, let me try to relate our societal acceptance of unwanted but
consensual sex with the sufferance of sexual assault and rape on our college
campuses. I have already indicated one problematic relation between these two
phenomena: Our contemporary focus on nonconsensual sex may indirectly
legitimate the harms occasioned by consensual sex, and make the latter all the
more difficult to see. After all, if rape is wrong because it is nonconsensual,
then it may seem to follow—although it should not—that so long as sex is
consensual, and therefore is not rape, it is accordingly good. Just as a focus
on the criminality of theft may blur or mask the wrongness of property, and
just as a focus on the wrongness of slavery can blur or mask the wrongness of a
great deal of wage labor, likewise here a focus on the wrongness of rape, sexual
assault, and nonconsensual sex can blur, or mask, the wrongness of many of
our consensual practices. That a practice—whether a labor, commercial, or
sexual practice—is consensual does indeed imply that it is not wrong by virtue
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of the presence of force or coercion that is obviated by the presence of consent.
It does not mean, though, that it isn’t wrong.
There is, though, a second and perhaps more subtle connection between
the ubiquity and relative invisibility of the harms of consensual but unwanted
sex and the occurrence on campuses of nonconsensual sex, sexual abuse, and
rape. Consensual sex is a transaction, and increasingly viewed as such. Sex is
an object of exchange. And, as it turns out, it’s not really worth all that much.
It’s something we’ll exchange for just about anything or nothing: not just
for security, money, drugs, rent, a grade, or a promotion, but for much less.
Perhaps for a tip regarding where we might buy a decent electric blanket, as the
late Helen Gurley Brown, the one-time and longtime editor of Cosmopolitan
magazine, apparently opined in the early 1960s, at least according to one
anecdote.13 Perhaps we trade it for a favor, or for an introduction to someone
who may further our career, or for a night out, or for a conversation, or for
help with a college paper. Unwanted but consensual casual sex traded for a
trifle—unlike unwanted but consensual long-term sex, or sex traded for the
material conditions of a livelihood, all of which carry their own profound
costs—becomes incidental to real human intimacy rather than a part of it; it is
neither necessary nor sufficient. It may supply human contact, but particularly
when it is unwanted, it doesn’t supply much; it’s worse than a snack of empty
calories.
If we view sex transactionally, as I suspect we are increasingly inclined
to do, and as we tolerate more and more consensual but unwanted sex as
we do so, then the significance of the difference between consensual and
nonconsensual sex, I suspect, narrows. A nonconsensual transaction, after all, is
a theft, and so nonconsensual sex, viewed transactionally, is more akin to theft
than it is to assault. And it’s a theft, as it turns out, of trivial value. So perhaps
nonconsensual sex should be treated as such: a misdemeanor, perhaps, hardly
a federal case.
To put this point clumsily, in a world in which sex has become thoroughly
“transactionalized,” the felt difference, particularly to the perpetrator and also
perhaps to the victim, between rape and sexual assault on the one hand and
consensual unwanted sex on the other is not so great as the difference between
rape or sexual assault and nontransactional sex that is desired, enjoyed, and
welcomed by both parties. If consensual sex is transactionalized—if it is traded
freely for very little and regardless of whether it is wanted, welcomed, or
enjoyed—then the theft of it is not as great a commission as the theft of that
which is highly valued and closely guarded. Let me put this the way a student
of mine put it to me a few years ago: In a world in which sex is transactional
and devalued, rape, he said, is like stealing a nickel from the tip jar in your local
diner. It is wrong and criminal, but hardly a crime of great moral turpitude.
13.
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Now, this conclusion sounds dismal, I realize, but it does suggest a partial
strategy for dealing with sexual assault on college campuses that I, at least,
have not yet heard articulated. Of course, we need to devise procedures for
dealing with rapes that respect norms of fairness and process as well as norms
of equality. As I noted at the outset, we don’t want our college campuses
remembered as places of unfair persecution any more than we want them
remembered as places of threat and danger. And, as is also widely now
acknowledged, we need to address the culture within which these assaults
occur. But if the above analysis is even partly correct, then that culture is
not only a fusion of alcohol, sports, fraternity life, undue feelings of sexual
entitlement, and the debasement or devaluing of women’s autonomy. All
of those might contribute to the current and intolerable high rate of sexual
assault on campus. But another part of the culture, and another causal factor,
may be the transactionalization of sex, and of unwanted consensual sex as,
increasingly, a transactional norm.
If that’s right, we could and should address it. We should at least discuss
it. For sex to be noncriminal, and for it not to be a violation of Title IX, it
must be nonassaultive, meaning minimally that it must be consensual. But
for sex to be good—for it to be morally justified, as well as noncriminal—it must
be good sex, and not just a good bargain. This is not just a pun on the word
“good.” In our relentless chase to capture the surplus value of our individual
and collective exchanges, we may have neglected to attend to the pleasures,
pains, and desires those choices reap. This may be happening—I believe it
is—in many aspects of our lives, not just the sexual: Across the board, we are
neglecting the full extent to which pleasure, pain, and desire may be guides to,
rather than impediments to, our subjective well-being, our objective interest,
and our moral choices all. In our sexual ethics, however, that disjunction
seems to have become a chasm. We should bridge it. The test of good sex is
how it feels, not what you got for it. Consent alone is not sufficient to render
sex wanted, welcomed, desired, desirable, or a pleasure. And for that reason,
consent is not a sufficient condition for the moral goodness of sex. Mutual
desire, mutual welcomeness, and mutual pleasure, by contrast, are verifiable
hedonic conditions of the moral quality of that which we seek, and of the ways
we seek intimacy with those we both love and respect. We should learn, or
relearn, to respect their teaching.

